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KŪ KIA‘I MAUNA: PROTECTING INDIGENOUS
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
Joshua Rosenberg*
Abstract: Courts historically side with private interests at the expense of Indigenous
religious rights. Continuing this trend, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court allowed the ThirtyMeter-Telescope to be built atop Maunakea, a mountain sacred to Native Hawaiians. This
decision led to a mass protest that was organized by Native Hawaiian rights advocates and
community members. However, notwithstanding the mountain’s religious and cultural
significance, Indigenous plaintiffs could not prevent construction of the telescope
on Maunakea.
Unlike most First Amendment rights, religious Free Exercise Clause claims are not
generally subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Congress has mandated the application of
strict scrutiny to federal government action that imposes a substantial burden on religious
activity through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, because most
courts narrowly interpret “substantial burden,” it has become nearly impossible for Indigenous
plaintiffs to succeed on claims involving violations of religious freedom. Moreover, RFRA
does not apply to state governments, and most states—including Hawai‘i—have not enacted
similar protections for religious rights.
This Comment suggests that the Hawai‘i State Legislature should enact a state version of
RFRA that would apply strict scrutiny to government actions that impose a substantial burden
on religious rights. Further, this Comment urges Congress and state legislatures to enact a more
expansive definition of “substantial burden” that respects the First Amendment rights of
Indigenous people to practice their beliefs.

INTRODUCTION
Located on the island of Hawai‘i,1 Maunakea2 is one of the most sacred
locations in Native Hawaiian culture.3 The Native Hawaiian community
has long opposed private development on the mountain, but until 2018,
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank
Professor Eberhard, Professor Gomulkiewicz, and Ms. Violet Pohakuku‘I‘ai Lui-Frank for their
invaluable time and guidance on this Comment. Also, mahalo nui loa to my family and friends for all
of their endless support of which I’m eternally grateful for. Lastly, thank you to the WLR editorial
staff for their incredible insight and feedback.
1. Commonly referred to as the “Big Island.”
2. There are generally two acceptable forms of spelling: “Maunakea” and “Mauna Kea.” The
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo College of Hawaiian Language recommends the former as the proper
Hawaiian usage. Thus, for the purposes of this article, Maunakea will be used. See Larry Kimura,
Why Is Maunakea Spelled as One Word?, KA WAI OLA, Nov. 2008, at 17.
3. See Meghan Miner Murray, Why Are Native Hawaiians Protesting Against a Telescope?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/us/hawaii-telescope-protest.html
[http://perma.cc/NP3W-ANLG].
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their opposition had never captured the national spotlight.4 Despite its
religious significance,5 astronomers continue to fight for private
development of additional observatories on Maunakea’s summit.6
Astronomers deem Maunakea one of the best sites in the world for
telescope placement because it stands taller than any other mountain on
Earth and has a stable climate that is well-suited for
astronomical observation.7
In 2018, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court permitted construction of the
Thirty-Meter Telescope (TMT) on Maunakea, sparking protests that
gained national attention.8 Applying a balancing test, the Court ruled that
construction of the TMT on Maunakea would neither interrupt any Native
Hawaiian religious practices nor affect the mountain’s natural resources.9
In response to the decision, the Native Hawaiian community led a
grassroots movement that delayed the telescope’s construction.10 This
movement was popularized on social media and garnered national
recognition through the use of the hashtags #A’oleTMT and
#weareMaunaKea.11
4. Kanaeokana, Fifty Years of Mismanaging Mauna Kea, VIMEO (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://vimeo.com/247038723 [http://perma.cc/9CRP-47CW].
5. See infra section I.A.
6. The Facts About TMT on Maunakea, TMT: THIRTY METER TELESCOPE,
http://www.maunakeaandtmt.org/facts-about-tmt/ [https://perma.cc/VSR5-E7P3].
7. See Our Story in Hawaii: Selecting Maunakea, TMT INT’L OBSERVATORY,
https://www.tmt.org/page/our-story-in-hawaii
[http://perma.cc/9W9A-GW2P]
(noting
that
Maunakea was selected for TMT because it has some of the best conditions for astronomy such as
dry and cold climate, and an exceptional atmosphere); see also Highest Mountain in the World,
GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/records/highest-mountain-in-the-world.shtml
[http://perma.cc/WAQ5-BRXF] (noting that Mount Everest is the highest, but Maunakea is
the tallest).
8. See In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw.
2018); Murray, supra note 3.
9. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768. The balancing test applied requires a balancing of
cultural, historical, or natural resources in the relevant area; the extent to which those resources—
including traditional and customary Native Hawaiian rights—will be affected or impaired by the
proposed action; and an assessment of the feasibility of an agency action to reasonably protect Native
Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist in the area. See infra section II.B.
10. Laurent Banguet, Giant Telescope Project in Hawaii Delayed by Protests, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 28,
2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-09-giant-telescope-hawaii-protests.html [http://perma.cc/G8QXQ7TW].
11. Many celebrities have also demonstrated their support of the cause by either posting on social
media or visiting Maunakea to stand in solidarity with the protestors, also known as Kia‘i. See Jhené
Aiko (@jheneaiko), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B1VRTN6BLMo/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson (@therock), INSTAGRAM (July 25, 2019),
https://www.instagram.com/p/B0Xfo3gFqxA (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Jason Momoa
(@prideofgypsies), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B1EMekJARb-/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Nicole Scherzinger (@nicolescherzinger), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 22, 2019),
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To Native Hawaiians, Maunakea has a central role in Hawaiian creation
stories.12 Maunakea also provides a deep spiritual connection to Native
Hawaiians’ ancestors, and is the resting place of numerous burial sites.13
The existing telescopes that were constructed by the University of Hawai‘i
(UH) in 196814 have polluted Maunakea’s cultural and natural resources
after fifty years of mismanagement.15 Even Hawai‘i Governor Ige, a
proponent of TMT, has acknowledged that UH has not met its obligations
to the mountain and the community.16 The community’s distrust is
compounded by Hawai‘i’s history of colonization—specifically the
United States’ illegal annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.17
Notwithstanding Maunakea’s central importance in Native Hawaiian
culture, UH’s mismanagement of existing telescopes, and Hawai‘i’s
history of colonization, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court still allowed
TMT’s construction.18 Thus, one can only wonder: what safeguards
protect Indigenous rights?19
The First Amendment provides a constitutional right to the free
exercise of religious beliefs—a right that extends to all people including
Indigenous people.20 Courts have historically applied strict scrutiny to
Free Exercise Clause claims under the First Amendment. Under strict
scrutiny, a law is constitutional only if that law is justified by a compelling
governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means in furtherance of
that government interest.21 However, the United States Supreme Court
decided Employment Division v. Smith22 in 1990, ruling that the state of
Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to an employee fired for using
https://www.instagram.com/p/B1elXCFhvZx/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Ian Somerhalder
(@iansomerhalder), INSTAGRAM (July 25, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B0Xb132pQ2Y (last
visited Jan. 19, 2021).
12. See infra section I.A.
13. See infra section I.A.
14. Kanaeokana, supra note 4.
15. See id.
16. See OHA Files Lawsuit Against State for Mismanagement of Mauna Kea, OFF. OF HAWAIIAN
AFFS. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.oha.org/news/oha-files-lawsuit-state-mismanagement-maunakea/ [http://perma.cc/75JA-CQJD].
17. See generally NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO
AMERICAN COLONIALISM 125–27 (2004).
18. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 782 (Haw. 2018).
19. “Indigenous” is capitalized throughout this Comment as it is being used as a reference to a
political community. See Christine Weeber, Why Capitalize “Indigenous”?, SAPIENS (May 19, 2020),
https://www.sapiens.org/language/capitalize-indigenous [http://perma.cc/SGB5-E3E3].
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07
(1963).
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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peyote—even though the employee used the substance as part of an
Indigenous tribe’s religious practice.23 The Court considered Oregon’s
ban on peyote a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” under
which an individual’s right to the free exercise of religion does not relieve
their obligation to comply with such a law.24 Moving forward, so long as
the challenged law is generally applicable, the Court no longer applies
strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims except in certain
situations—further
eroding
the
protections
of
Indigenous
religious rights.25
In response to Smith, Congress sought to provide protection for
religious liberty and enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) in 1993.26 RFRA statutorily requires courts to apply strict
scrutiny to religious freedom claims.27 Accordingly, under a RFRA claim,
if a government action substantially burdens a person’s exercise of
religion, the government must demonstrate that the burden “(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”28
When Congress enacted RFRA, it intended to mandate the application
of strict scrutiny to federal and state government action that imposes a
substantial burden on religious exercise.29 However, the Supreme Court
ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the individual states.30
As a result, state government action that infringes on Indigenous religious
exercise is not subject to strict scrutiny unless states enact their own
versions of RFRA. To date, twenty-one states have done so,31 but Hawai‘i
has not.32 Therefore, Hawai‘i state courts are under no statutory duty to
apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims challenging laws of
general applicability. Even though the Native Hawaiian appellants
asserted RFRA claims in the Maunakea litigation, the Hawai‘i State
Supreme Court dismissed them because RFRA is inoperable as applied to

23. Id. at 874, 890.
24. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
25. See infra section II.A.
26. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694 (2014); Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
28. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
29. Id. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
30. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–36 (1997).
31. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4,
2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5KKC-ERJ6].
32. Id.
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the individual states and no Hawai‘i state RFRA exists.33
Where RFRA does apply, plaintiffs must first establish that the
government action imposes a substantial burden on their religious
practices.34 However, the courts have imposed strict limitations on what
constitutes a substantial burden.35 Federal courts generally find a
substantial burden in only two situations: where individuals are forced to
choose between their religion and receiving a governmental benefit, and
where people are coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by threat
of civil or criminal sanctions.36 Under this doctrine, any burden outside of
these two narrow criteria is not substantial and does not require a strict
scrutiny analysis of the government action.37
Therefore, this Comment calls for the Hawai‘i State Legislature to
enact a state RFRA and adopt a new definition of “substantial burden”
that rectifies the denial of Native Hawaiian and Indigenous religious
rights. Part I provides a brief overview of Hawai‘i’s history and
Maunakea’s significance to the Native Hawaiian community. This Part
also documents Maunakea’s existing astronomical usage and the current
state of the protests against additional development. Part II outlines the
limited constitutional and statutory protections for Indigenous religious
exercise, including the First Amendment and RFRA. Moreover, this Part
analyzes the application of RFRA to Indigenous religious claims in two
federal cases. Part III examines the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court case that
allowed TMT’s construction and the Court’s reasoning in rejecting the
Native Hawaiians’ claims. Part IV proposes two critical changes in the
law to rectify the concerns over Native Hawaiian rights. First, the Hawai‘i
State Legislature should enact a Hawai‘i state RFRA. Second, Congress
and state legislatures should codify a more expansive definition of
“substantial burden” that will adequately protect Indigenous
religious beliefs.
I.

HAWAI‘I INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE TMT STAND OFF

The increasingly popular Hawaiian phrase “Kū Kia‘i Mauna”—
literally translated as “guardians of the mountain”—has echoed across the

33. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 771 (Haw. 2018).
34. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008).
35. Id.
36. Id. (combining the holdings in both Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) to establish a rule determining if a substantial burden exists).
37. See id. at 1070.
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nation over the past few years.38 This phrase relates to Maunakea, a
mountain that Native Hawaiians hold sacred. Notwithstanding
Maunakea’s cultural significance, telescopes currently occupy
Maunakea’s summit, which astronomers see as an exceptional site for
observation. In 2019, protests erupted as Native Hawaiians and advocates
for Native Hawaiian rights sought to block construction of TMT, a $1.4
billion project that would place an eighteen-story telescope atop
Maunakea.39 The protests have delayed construction, but uncertainty
remains about whether Native Hawaiians will receive long term legal
protection for Maunakea.
A.

Native Hawaiian Indigenous Rights History and the Significance
of Maunakea

The Maunakea protests have a deep history that stems from the Native
Hawaiian community’s distrust of both the state and federal governments.
This distrust reaches all the way back to what U.S. President Grover
Cleveland admitted was the United States’ illegal annexation of the
Kingdom of Hawai‘i.40 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Queen
Lili‘uokalani became the ruler of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.41 However, a
group of U.S. politicians and businessmen organized a military coup to
overthrow Lili‘uokalani.42 In a conspiracy organized by U.S. Minister
John L. Stevens, American soldiers were sent to the Hawaiian Islands,
occupied a government building, and declared themselves the Republic of
Hawai‘i.43 Queen Lili‘uokalani acquiesced to avoid the bloodshed of her
people, in hopes that the U.S. President would rectify the situation.44
Although efforts to ratify a treaty of annexation failed in the Senate, the

38. Ryan Collins, A Sign of Solidarity for Mauna Kea, THE GARDEN ISLAND (July 20, 2019, 12:05
AM), https://www.thegardenisland.com/2019/07/20/hawaii-news/a-sign-of-solidarity-for-maunakea/ [http://perma.cc/6NJQ-77KM].
39. Murray, supra note 3; Amy Goodman, “We Are Not Anti-Science”: Why Indigenous Protectors
Oppose the Thirty Meter Telescope at Mauna Kea, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 22, 2019),
https://www.democracynow.org/2019/7/22/why_indigenous_protectors_oppose_the_thirty
[http://perma.cc/GPS8-8YDH].
40. See generally SILVA, supra note 17 (describing the reasons the United States’ annexation of
Hawai‘i was illegal).
41. See id. at 129–31.
42. Id.
43. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the illegal annexation of Hawai‘i, specifically the messy
political intervention of Americans, see id.
44. Id. at 165; see also Monarchy Overthrown, HAWAIIHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.hawaiihistory.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ig.page&PageID=312 [http://perma.cc/V2W3BQTB] (explaining that Queen Lili‘uokalani acquiesced after the American businessmen staged
a coup).
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United States annexed Hawai‘i under a Congressional joint-resolution in
1898.45 Native Hawaiians resisted, but “[d]espite the continuous mass
protest, the flag of the United States was hoisted over Hawai‘i.”46 Scholars
have explained that the “United States . . . treated the Hawaiian Islands as
if it were an American colony in order to disguise the illegal nature of its
occupation of an independent and neutral State.”47 After the annexation,
the United States acquired approximately 1.5 to 1.8 million acres of
land—statutorily referred to as the “ceded” lands.48 Maunakea is part of
these ceded lands that originally belonged to the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.49
The Territory of Hawai‘i officially became the fiftieth state when the
United States Congress passed the Hawaii Admission Act in 1959.50 The
federal government returned the ceded lands to the state with the
requirement that Hawai‘i “hold these lands in a trust for specific purposes,
including ‘betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians.’”51 The
Native Hawaiians’ outrage comes from the fact that the United States
illegally annexed the Hawaiian Kingdom, then returned the ceded lands
to the Hawai‘i State Government rather than the Native Hawaiian people.
To Native Hawaiians, this makes the Hawai‘i State officials mere

45. Wynell Schamel & Charles E. Schamel, The 1897 Petition Against the Annexation of Hawaii,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/hawaii-petition [http://perma.cc/
JR28-S772] (noting that U.S. Senate ratification for treaties requires a two-thirds majority, but joint
resolutions may be passed by a simple majority in both chambers of Congress).
46. SILVA, supra note 17, at 161. In order to preserve the interests of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i,
David Keanu Sai and Donald A. Lewis took deliberate political steps to establish an acting Regent
under the legal doctrine of necessity. See David Keanu Sai, Establishing an Acting Regency: A
Countermeasure Necessitated to Protect the Interest of the Hawaiian State 2 (Nov. 28, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with HawaiianKingdom.org), https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Ac
ting_Government.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5TL-RRLB]. This acting regency was established under
article 33 of the Constitution and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom and operates “on the legal
presumption that sovereignty remains vested in the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1843 despite the
effectiveness of prolonged occupation.” Id. at 4.
47. Sai, supra note 46, at 4.
48. See Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(g), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959); Lane Kaiwi
Opulauoho, Trust Lands for the Native Hawaiian Nation: Lessons from Federal Indian Law
Precedents, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75, 75 n.1 (2018) (stating that the ceded lands consist of both
“crown and government lands that were summarily seized and confiscated when Hawai‘i was annexed
to the United States in 1898”).
49. See Zachary Browning, A Comparative Analysis: Legal and Historical Analysis of Protecting
Indigenous Cultural Rights Involving Land Disputes in Japan, New Zealand, and Hawai‘i, 28 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 207, 234 (2019).
50. Hawaii Admission Act.
51. See Trisha Kehaulani Watson-Sproat, Why Native Hawaiians Are Fighting to Protect
Maunakea
from
a
Telescope,
VOX
(July
24,
2019,
12:30
PM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/7/24/20706930/mauna-kea-hawaii (last visited Feb. 3, 2021)
(quoting Hawaii Admission Act § 5(f)).
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“temporary stewards of these crown lands.”52
Maunakea’s cultural significance in Hawaiian culture is immeasurable.
Hawaiian traditions of creation dictate that Maunakea was named after
Wākea,53 the Sky Father, who together with Papahānaumoku, the Earth
Mother, created the Hawaiian Islands. Maunakea’s summit is known as
Kūkahau‘ula and is the place where the gods reside.54 The Native
Hawaiians believe the summit touches the sky, giving them a spiritual
connection to their ancestors and ensuring the “rights to regenerative
powers of all that is Hawai‘i.”55 In the pre-colonial years of Hawai‘i, only
chiefs and priests of the highest status were permitted to visit
Maunakea’s summit.56
Lake Waiau is among the most religiously significant sites on
Maunakea. To this day, Native Hawaiians utilize Lake Waiau’s waters,
which are associated with the god Kāne, in religious practices.57
According to members of the Waimea Hawaiian Civic Club, it was a
common practice for Native Hawaiians to deposit a child’s umbilical cord
near Lake Waiau, believing that failure to properly dispose the umbilical
cord would alter the child’s destiny.58 Moreover, Maunakea serves as the
eternal resting place for those buried across its topography.59 In discussing
the importance of Maunakea, Alexander Kanani‘alika Lancaster, a Native
Hawaiian cultural practitioner, has emphasized that his family still travels
up to the sacred mountain “for ceremonial” purposes to bless the mountain
52. Id. For more information regarding the illegal annexation of Hawai‘i, see SILVA, supra note 17,
at 160 (“The document also recited the history of the failed annexation treaty, and pointed out that
‘by memorial the people of Hawaii have protested against the consummation of an invasion of their
political rights, and have fervently appealed . . . to refrain from further participating in the wrongful
annexation of Hawaii.’”).
53. Native Hawaiian traditions identify Maunakea as “Ka Mauna a Wākea,” translating to “The
Mountain of Wākea.” See Christine Hitt, The Sacred History of Maunakea, HONOLULU MAG.
(Aug. 5, 2019), http://www.honolulumagazine.com/Honolulu-Magazine/August-2019/The-SacredHistory-of-Mauna-Kea/ [http://perma.cc/FCV7-QW25].
54. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757–58
(Haw. 2018).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 758.
57. See Hitt, supra note 53.
58. See KEPA MALY & ONAONA MALY, “MAUNA KEA–KA PIKO KAULANA O KA ‘ĀINA”: A
COLLECTION OF NATIVE TRADITIONS, HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS, AND ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
FOR: MAUNA KEA, THE LANDS OF KA‘OHE, HUMU‘ULA AND THE ‘ĀINA MAUNA ON THE ISLAND OF
HAWAI‘I 637 (2005), http://www.malamamaunakea.org/uploads/culture/CulturalDocuments/MalyK
_2005_MaunaKeaOralHistory_HiMK67_OMKM033005b_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/2T2B-CSFL].
59. See PATRICK C. MCCOY, SARA COLLINS, STEPHAN D. CLARK & VALERIE PARK, A CULTURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I MANAGEMENT AREAS ON
MAUNA KEA KA‘OHE AHUPUA‘A, HĀMĀKUA DISTRICT, ISLAND OF HAWAI‘I 2-24 (2009); In re
CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 769.
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for all of their ancestors buried on Maunakea.60
Maunakea is considered among the most sacred sites in the Hawaiian
archipelago. The protests demonstrate this cultural and religious
importance and the extraordinary measures the Native Hawaiian
community will take to protect its sacred lands.
B.

Maunakea’s Historic Mismanagement and Its Current Protectors

Thirteen telescopes currently occupy Maunakea’s summit.61 Their
mismanagement has led Native Hawaiians to distrust the promises made
by the TMT International Observatory and the Hawai‘i state government
to preserve and protect Maunakea’s cultural importance and landscape.62
The telescope takeover of Maunakea commenced in 1968, when the
University of Hawai‘i (UH) signed a sixty-five year general lease with the
Hawai‘i State Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) for 13,321
acres of ceded lands at Maunakea’s summit.63 UH selected Maunakea
because it was an “exceptional site for astronomical observation.”64
Despite the government’s promise to protect Maunakea, significant
pollution on the mountain led the Sierra Club to file a complaint that
forced UH to clean up accumulated trash on the summit—at a reported
cost of $20,000.65
The extent of this pollution remained unclear until increased public
concern led the state legislature to order an audit of Maunakea’s
management.66 In 1998, the state auditor “release[d] a scathing report
documenting 30 years of mismanagement of [Maunakea] by both the
BLNR and UH.”67 Subpoenaed documents later revealed that sewage,
ethylene glycol, diesel fuel, and toxic mercury had polluted Maunakea

60. MCCOY ET AL., supra note 59, at 2-24.
61. Kanaeokana, supra note 4.
62. The Facts About TMT on Maunakea, supra note 6.
63. Kanaeokana, supra note 4. Maunakea is also in a conservation district in which the Department
of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) and BLNR are responsible for overseeing and ensuring that
the use of the land is in compliance with state regulations such as the “allowable uses . . . on
conservation lands ‘consistent with the conservation . . . of land and natural resources adequate for
present growth and future needs, and conservation and preservation of open space areas for public
use and enjoyment.’” See OFF. OF HAWAIIAN AFFS., INTRODUCTION TO HAWAI‘I’S LAND
CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
21
(2015),
http://www.oha.org/wpcontent/uploads/HRDC-LUTPManual_PRF6_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/48BJ-YA33].
64. N. Jamiyla Chisholm, Watch: The 50-Year History of Mismanagement at Hawai‘i’s Mauna
Kea, COLORLINES (July 19, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/watch-50-yearhistory-mismanagement-hawaiis-mauna-kea [http://perma.cc/UE9N-7GYA].
65. Kanaeokana, supra note 4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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and caused substantial harm to Maunakea’s cultural and natural
resources.68 Further, the construction projects generated significant
amounts of trash, including “remnants of [old] testing
equipment . . . [and] two concrete slabs located on one of the [sacred]
sites.”69 The state auditor continuously pressed UH and the BLNR to
review and update their leases, subleases, permits, and agreements as they
“lack[ed] provisions providing for adequate stewardship of [Maunakea],
such as ones addressing cultural and historical preservation.”70
Community members attribute this mismanagement to UH’s place among
academia, favoring astronomy research over everything else.71 While UH
has taken steps to address these issues,72 the state audit explicitly stated
that UH’s 1986 Historic Preservation Plan is “over ten years late.”73
Native Hawaiians argue that the years of mismanagement have already
demonstrated UH’s “inability to ensure that the environmental and
cultural significance of the mountain is recognized and protected.”74
The 1998 state audit found a “lack of recognition for cultural or
religious sites on Mauna Kea.”75 UH’s astronomy projects force many
Native Hawaiian cultural practitioners to either forgo their customary and
traditional religious exercises or accept the impact of the existing
telescopes and observatories on Native Hawaiian practices.76 Native

68. Id.; Debbie Dickinson, The Issue of TMT on Mauna Kea, with Insights by SU Students,
SPECTATOR (Oct. 23, 2019), https://seattlespectator.com/2019/10/23/destruction-of-sacredmountain-in-hawaii-impacts-su-students/ [https://perma.cc/AMJ8-JD8L].
69. THE AUDITOR, STATE OF HAWAI‘I, REP. NO. 98-6, AUDIT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF MAUNA
KEA AND THE MAUNA KEA SCIENCE RESERVE 24–25 (1998).
70. Dan Ahuna, Mauna Kea Deserves New Management, HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.civilbeat.org/2017/12/mauna-kea-deserves-new-management/ [http://perma.cc/7XM5BGCK].
71. Id.
72. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 759 (Haw. 2018)
(discussing UH’s Master Plan that updated its management guidelines to make protecting Maunakea’s
cultural and natural resources one of its primary goals).
73. THE AUDITOR, supra note 69, at 22.
74. Chad Blair, OHA Sues State, UH Over ‘Longstanding Mismanagement’ of Mauna Kea,
HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.civilbeat.org/2017/11/oha-sues-state-uh-overlongstanding-mismanagement-of-mauna-kea/ [https://perma.cc/D6QA-KYS4] (quoting OHA
Trustee Dan Ahuna). In fact, this management has led the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) to file
a lawsuit on behalf Native Hawaiian people to hold the state and UH accountable for its “welldocumented mismanagement of Mauna Kea.” See Mauna Kea, OFF. OF HAWAIIAN AFFS.,
https://www.oha.org/maunakea/ [https://perma.cc/YEX4-42KU] (“[T]he state and UH have failed as
trustees and stewards of this beloved sacred place. Even the governor and the university president
have both publicly admitted to failing to meet their management responsibilities.”).
75. THE AUDITOR, supra note 69, at 23.
76. Id. (noting that Native Hawaiian practitioners had to partake in an onerous process just to have
access to use the land for religious reasons).
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Hawaiians are only allowed to practice their religion if they first receive
permission to access the land from the Institute for Astronomy and submit
a Conservation District Use Application to the Department of Land and
Natural Resources to use the land for religious practices.77
According to TMT proponents, Maunakea was selected for the project
because of its stable climate and other exceptional conditions.78
Additionally, Maunakea rises 13,796 feet above sea level and over 33,000
feet in all, making it the tallest mountain on Earth.79 The TMT
organization theorizes that this project will result in groundbreaking
astronomical discoveries, including the observation of other galaxies.80
The protestors, or Kia‘i,81 defending Maunakea, reject the notion that
they are anti-science; rather, they state that they are merely “against the
building of anything 18 stories over [their] watershed, water aquifers, on
[their] sacred mountain.”82 Their frustration is exacerbated by TMT’s
selection of Maunakea over La Palma, in the Canary Islands, as the site
for the project.83 TMT officials have acknowledged that their alternative
mountain peak in La Palma is a comparable option,84 and there is no
significant opposition there.85
While protests against development on Maunakea began as early as
77. Id.
78. Our Story in Hawaii: Selecting Maunakea, supra note 7.
79. See Mauna Kea Facts, PROTECT MAUNA KEA, https://www.protectmaunakea.net/mauna-keafacts [https://perma.cc/N9DB-WZES] (“Mauna Kea is the tallest—though not the highest—mountain
on Planet Earth. Rising 13,796 ft above sea level, it is over 33,000 ft tall when measured from its base
at the bottom of the sea.”); Highest Mountain in the World, supra note 7; (“Mauna Kea is an island,
and if the distance from the bottom of the nearby Pacific Ocean floor to the peak of the island is
measured, then Mauna Kea is “taller” than Mount Everest.”).
80. See TMT Hoping to Add to New Discoveries Made Atop Maunakea, HAW. NEWS NOW,
https://www.hinowdaily.com/tmt-hoping-to-add-to-new-discoveries-made-atop-maunakea
[http://perma.cc/WC8C-FCK7]; Chloe Fox, Everything You Need to Know About the Viral Protests
Against a Hawaii Telescope, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hawaiitelescope-protests-tmt-mauna-kea_n_7044164 [http://perma.cc/F65P-WQUJ].
81. Translated on https://www.wehewehe.org, “Kia‘i” means guard, watchman, and caretaker. The
protestors have given themselves the name Kia‘i and this article will refer to them both as “protestors”
and “Kia‘i” interchangeably.
82. Goodman, supra note 39.
83. Caleb Jones, TMT Backup Site “Excellent,” Comparable to Maunakea, Experts Say, HAW.
TRIB. HERALD (Aug. 26, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.hawaiitribune-herald.com/2019/08/26
/hawaii-news/tmt-backup-site-excellent-comparable-to-maunakea-experts-say
[http://perma.cc/TTH8-2KHR].
84. Id.
85. Id. But see Jonathan Saupe, Environmentalists in Canary Islands Gear Up for a Fight Against
TMT, HAW. NEWS NOW (Aug. 7, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2019/08/07/en
vironmentalists-canary-islands-gear-up-fight-against-tmt/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) (discussing how
Ecologistas en Acción has vowed to take legal action to stop TMT from building in the
Canary Islands).
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1968 when UH signed the first set of leases, they had subsided until the
Hawai‘i State Supreme Court upheld the BLNR’s grant of a construction
permit for TMT.86 The current protests commenced around July 15, 2019,
when construction of TMT was slated to begin.87 An estimated 10,000 to
15,000 protestors from all over the State of Hawai‘i and the mainland88
came to Maunakea to voice their concerns.89 The Kia‘i blocked the only
access road to the summit, preventing construction of TMT.90 Many
advocates of Native Hawaiian rights living across the nation organized
protests within their respective cities.91 This demonstration has evolved
beyond a mere protest as the Kia‘i have used this opportunity to educate
others about Native Hawaiian culture.92 Across from the Maunakea access
road, the Kia‘i have established “Pu‘uhonua o Pu‘uhuluhulu,” an
academic institution dedicated to educating protestors and visitors about
Native Hawaiian culture, further preserving Hawaiian culture in a
continuing effort to protect Indigenous rights from private development.93
II.

THE CLASH BETWEEN INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT

When balancing Indigenous groups’ religious rights against competing
private- and public-development interests, courts often favor the latter. In
Smith, the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny does not apply to First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause claims so long as the challenged law is
valid, neutral, and generally applicable—even if it substantially burdens
86. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw. 2018);
see infra Part II.
87. Kristin Lam, Why Are Jason Momoa and Other Native Hawaiians Protesting a Telescope on
Mauna Kea? What’s at Stake?, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2019, 8:55 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/21/mauna-kea-tmt-protests-hawaii-nativerights-telescope/1993037001/ [http://perma.cc/L5SA-DTA6].
88. People from Hawai‘i refer to the continental United States as the “mainland,” although many
Native Hawaiians refer to it as the “continent,” reflecting their disdain at the U.S. government for the
illegal annexation of Hawai‘i.
89. Lam, supra note 87.
90. See Watson-Sproat, supra note 51.
91. See, e.g., Thirty Meter Telescope Protests Held in Las Vegas, New York, STAR ADVERTISER
(July 20, 2019), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2019/07/20/breaking-news/thirty-meter-telescopeprotests-held-in-las-vegas-new-york/ [http://perma.cc/363F-U3TG] (noting that protests of TMT
construction on Maunakea have been organized in New York, Las Vegas, and other U.S. cities).
Professors from the UH at Mānoa such as Presley Ah Mook Sang come to Maunakea and teach
classes. Id.
92. Lam, supra note 87.
93. Michael Brestovansky, Makeshift “University” Established at Protestors’ Camp, W. HAW.
TODAY (July 25, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.westhawaiitoday.com/2019/07/25/hawaiinews/makeshift-university-established-at-protesters-camp/ [http://perma.cc/K8WE-CGBH].
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the free exercise of religion.94 Although Congress has mandated the
application of strict scrutiny by statute through RFRA, the Supreme Court
held RFRA is inapplicable to the states.95 While some states have passed
their own version of RFRA, many—including Hawai‘i—have not.96
Moreover, because the federal courts have narrowly construed
“substantial burden,” it has become nearly impossible for Indigenous
plaintiffs to overcome this initial obstacle and succeed on their
RFRA claims.
A.

Development of Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence

Rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Free
Exercise Clause aims to secure religious liberties for individuals.97
Therefore, the Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”98 For Free Exercise Clause claims, there are several strands
of jurisprudence that dictate whether courts apply a strict scrutiny
analysis. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the
challenged law is justified by a compelling governmental interest and is
the least restrictive means in furtherance of that interest.99 The first strand
is when the challenged law discriminates against or singles out religious
people or practices.100 With these laws, courts apply strict scrutiny.101
Next, there are generally applicable laws in which courts will only apply
strict scrutiny to hybrid claims102 or a denial of religious exemptions if

94. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
95. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
96. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 31 (noting that Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia have state versions of RFRA).
97. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07
(1963).
100. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“Official
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance
with the requirement of facial neutrality.”).
101. See id.
102. Hybrid claims involve the denial of the free exercise of religion in conjunction with another
constitutionally protected freedom. See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”).
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other exemptions are provided.103 Lastly, there are cases discussing the
Free Exercise clause in contexts where the government is operating its
property in a manner that burdens religious practices.104 Courts generally
do not apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims in
this context.105
Historically, courts applied strict scrutiny to most Free Exercise Clause
claims.106 In Sherbert v. Verner,107 the plaintiff was a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and was fired for refusing to work on
Saturdays, the Sabbath Day of her faith.108 Unable to obtain other
employment for this same reason, the plaintiff filed a claim for
unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act.109 However, the Employment
Security Commission noted that, under the state statute, “good cause” is
needed to reject suitable work when it is offered.110 The Commission ruled
that the plaintiff’s inability to work on Saturdays was not “good cause”
and disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits.111
The plaintiff then brought a claim under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment alleging that the South Carolina statute abridged her
right to the free exercise of religion.112 The Supreme Court stated that the
103. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84 (noting that strict scrutiny applies when a State has an
individual exemptions system and refuses to extend those exemptions to cases of “religious
hardship”). Generally applicable laws are those that do not single out or target specific groups. See,
e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (ruling that
the regulation was not neutral nor generally applicable because it “single[d] out houses of worship for
especially harsh treatment”). Other courts have seen Roman Catholic Diocese as a seismic shift in
Free Exercise law as it held that disparate treatment of religion rendered COVID-19 restrictions not
neutral or generally applicable. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020
WL 7350247, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2020).
104. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (involving
a dispute between the U.S. Forest Service and American Indian tribes over a proposal to construct a
paved road through federal land that has historically been used by various tribes for
religious activities).
105. See id. (declining to apply Sherbert’s compelling interest test where the challenged action was
the government’s construction of a road).
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (applying
strict scrutiny to an Indiana Employment Security Review Board denial of a claim for unemployment
compensation where the claimant was terminated because his religious beliefs interfered with his
work); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (applying strict
scrutiny to a plaintiff’s claim where the plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation benefits
after being fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath).
107. 347 U.S. 398 (1963).
108. Id. at 399.
109. Id. at 399–400.
110. Id. at 401.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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statute is constitutional if “any incidental burden on the free exercise of
[plaintiff’s] religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest.’” 113
To justify the burden imposed on the plaintiff, the state asserted that the
infringement was necessary to prevent “the filing of fraudulent claims by
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work”
that would “dilute the unemployment compensation fund” and “hinder the
scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.”114 The Court
disagreed and did not find this government interest compelling enough to
justify the substantial burden imposed on the plaintiff.115
Sherbert’s broad application of strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause
claims began to narrow in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association.116 In this case, the Court discussed the application of
Sherbert’s compelling interest test in a dispute involving Indigenous
rights and government action. Lyng involved Indian tribes challenging the
U.S. Forest Service’s approval of plans to construct a logging road in the
Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest in California.117 The
Indigenous groups argued that the construction would disturb the sacred
area, interfering with the tribes’ free exercise of religion and causing
irreparable damage.118 The Court disagreed, explaining that
accommodating all religious rights would not allow the government to
operate:
Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit’s
prediction, according to which the G-O road will “virtually
destroy the . . . Indian’s ability to practice their religion,” the
Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify
upholding [the tribes’] legal claims. However much we might
wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate
if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and
desires.
....
. . . Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,
however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to
use what is, after all, its land.119
The Indigenous groups also asserted that, in accordance with Sherbert,

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 407.
Id.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
See id.
Id. at 443–44.
See id. at 451–53 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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the government must demonstrate a compelling interest in completing the
road.120 However, the Court disagreed, finding that no such interest was
necessary because the “incidental effects of government programs . . . [do
not] require [the] government to bring forward a compelling justification
for its otherwise lawful actions.”121 The Court essentially held the
Sherbert compelling interest test inapplicable and justified that holding
based on the government’s inability to function if forced to account for
every tribes’ religious exercises.122 Lyng applies the Free Exercise Clause
in a different context—the government conducting its own internal affairs
rather than passing laws that infringe on religious rights—which may
indicate that RFRA only applies to challenges against laws. However,
courts have applied RFRA in cases involving challenges to statutes and
government actions in the same context as Lyng.123
Lyng was, in part, a precursor to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith—
a decision that severely limited the Free Exercise Clause’s religious
protections.124 In Smith, two Native American plaintiffs were fired for
ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes during a religious ceremony.125
Both applied for unemployment benefits but were denied because of their
discharge for work-related misconduct.126 The Employment Division
argued that denial of unemployment benefits was permissible because
Oregon law criminalized the ingestion of peyote.127
The plaintiffs argued that Sherbert required states to demonstrate a
compelling interest that justified governmental actions that substantially
burdened an individual’s religious practices.128 Rather than following its
own precedent, the Court departed from it and severely limited the
compelling interest test to the facts of Sherbert.129 The Court noted that
the Sherbert test was developed in the context of unemployment
compensation eligibility rules.130 Thus, it is inapplicable to an across-the120. See id. at 447.
121. See id. at 450–51.
122. See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (“Never to our knowledge has the Court
interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual
believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.” (emphasis in original)).
123. See infra section II.C.
124. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
125. Id. at 874.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 875.
128. Id. at 883.
129. Id. at 888–89.
130. See id. at 882–85.
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board criminal prohibition on particular conduct.131 The Smith Court’s
holding stands for the proposition that the right of free exercise of religion
does not warrant strict scrutiny as long as the law curtailing religious
freedom is one of general applicability.132 Accordingly, the Court held that
the denial of unemployment compensation benefits did not violate the
plaintiffs’ religious rights because the Oregon law was a general criminal
prohibition on the use of peyote.133 This case completely changed First
Amendment jurisprudence because “[t]he Court found strict scrutiny
inapposite, despite the longstanding tradition of applying this heightened
scrutiny standard to fundamental interests, and hesitated to deem
infringements on the exercise of religion presumptively invalid.”134
Today, under Free Exercise Clause claims, neutral laws of general
applicability are not subject to strict scrutiny besides the aforementioned
exemptions. Scholars have called Smith “a transformative moment in First
Amendment law.”135 With the widespread criticism of Smith and the
widespread Congressional and public support of RFRA, Congress was
primed to pass additional religious statutory protections.136
B.

Legislative History and Passage of RFRA

In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA in an attempt to restore
Sherbert’s broad application of strict scrutiny.137 Under RFRA, the
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”138
Congress’s stark disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith is
evident in RFRA’s language where it explicitly references Smith’s general

131. See id.
132. See id. at 879; see also Sara Movahed, Hope for the Hopi in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: The
Supreme Court’s Recent Interpretation of RFRA and Strengthening Native Americans’ ReligiousBased Land Rights Claims, 31 MD. J. INT’L L. 244, 247 (2016).
133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
134. Movahed, supra note 132, at 247.
135. Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American Indian
Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 389 (2012).
136. See Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A
Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531, 534 (1993).
137. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03 (2020); see also United States v.
Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Ariz. 2006) (recognizing that “RFRA is not interpreted
by the federal courts as a ‘separate’ statutory defense to a criminal charge, but as an instruction to the
courts to replace the Smith standard for evaluating First Amendment free exercise claims with the
‘compelling interest’ test”); Meyer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 929 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1996)
(stating that the “purpose of the RFRA was merely [to] ‘restore the compelling interest test’” that was
applicable pre-Smith (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993)).
138. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a) (emphasis added).
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applicability rule. Many religious groups supported this passage, but
“[l]ost in this conversation . . . have been the American Indians who
actually lost the right to practice their religion in Smith.”139 One scholar
speculated that it was “the Court’s inability to discern a limit on the Indian
religious practices” that led to the outright denial of such claims.140
Although Congress’s purpose for passing RFRA was to protect the free
exercise of religion, courts severely limited RFRA’s effectiveness.141 A
significant limiting principle was established in City of Boerne v.
Flores.142 In Boerne, the Court found RFRA unconstitutional as applied
to the states because it exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers.143 Therefore, for most state actions, plaintiffs’
primary legal recourse for religious rights violations is limited to a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause where Smith’s rule of general applicability
remains the law. In contrast, when plaintiffs assert federal violations of
the free exercise of religion, courts apply strict scrutiny to their RFRA
claims, but Smith’s holding to their Free Exercise Clause claims. While
unable to constitutionally overrule the decision in Smith, Congress
effectively mandated—through RFRA—the application of strict scrutiny
analysis to federal laws substantially burdening an individual’s free
exercise of religion. Accordingly, RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause are
conceptually distinct; they are two potential legal protections with two
completely different standards for plaintiffs suffering a substantial burden
on their freedom of religion.
Although some states have their own version of RFRA, Hawai‘i does
not. In 2017, the Hawai‘i State Legislature considered House Bill 823,144
a bill that would have provided RFRA-like protections, “to ensure that
strict scrutiny [would be] applied in all cases where state action burdens
the exercise of religion.”145 Similar to RFRA, this bill would only allow
the government to impose a burden on religious practices if the burden
was essential to further a compelling governmental interest and was the

139. Carpenter, supra note 135, at 390.
140. Id. at 392. Carpenter argues that minority religions have much more difficulty in succeeding
under a RFRA claim. See id. at 392–93. She attributes this difficulty to the fact that judges rely on
their common sense and experiences in religious cases. Id. Consequently, judges find it difficult to
evaluate the legitimacy and scope of particular minority, religious practices (i.e., Native Hawaiian
and Native American religious practices) and instead, “prefer bright line rules over nuanced analysis.”
Id. at 393.
141. See infra Part IV.
142. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
143. See id.
144. H.R. 823, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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least restrictive means of furthering that interest.146 However, it failed to
pass.147 It is unclear why the bill failed, but in general, major challenges
with passing state RFRAs include worries of increased litigation and
conflict between religious liberty and civil rights.148 More specifically,
civil rights advocates have raised concerns that a state RFRA may allow
individuals or corporations to discriminate against others on the grounds
of “race, gender, age, nationality, or sexual orientation,” which would
inhibit enforcement of state civil rights laws.149
C.

Application of RFRA to Indigenous Rights

Even with federal government action, where RFRA applies, Indigenous
plaintiffs face substantial obstacles to their Free Exercise Clause claims.
Federal courts have developed a two-part test to determine whether
religious rights are protected under RFRA: first, there must be evidence
sufficient for a trier of fact to find the activity the Indigenous group claims
is burdened by government action is an exercise of religion;150 and second,
“the government action must ‘substantially burden’ the plaintiff’s
exercise of religion.”151 This substantial burden requirement has proven
fatal to many Indigenous groups’ RFRA claims because federal courts
have limited its applicability to two strict situations.
First, an individual incurs a substantial burden when they “are forced
to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit.”152 The Court developed this part of the test in
Sherbert when it held that the South Carolina statute unconstitutionally
forced the plaintiff “to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of

146. Id.
147. Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
(RFRA),
REWIRE
NEWS
GRP.,
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/religious-freedom-restoration-act/
[http://perma.cc/X6QR-G3YN].
148. See Robert M. O’Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus
Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 792 (1999) (discussing the conflict between RFRA and state
civil rights laws); see also Elizabeth Long, Note, A Case for Kentucky’s State RFRA in Its Current
Form, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 252 (2016) (acknowledging that in light of the decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), state RFRAs have been labeled as “‘a license to discriminate’ against
the LGBT community” (citation omitted)); Alan Reinach, Why We Need State RFRA Bills: A Panel
Discussion, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 823, 825 (1999) (explaining that senators in the Arizona State
Senate argued that a state RFRA would open the door to a drastic increase in litigation if the bill
were adopted).
149. See O’Neil, supra note 148, at 792; Long, supra note 148, at 252.
150. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)).
152. Id. at 1070.
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her religion in order to accept work.”153
Second, an individual who is “coerced to act contrary to their religious
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions” suffers a substantial
burden.154 The Court developed this part of the substantial burden
requirement in Wisconsin v. Yoder,155 where members of the Amish
religion refused to have their kids attend school in violation of a
Wisconsin statute that imposed criminal sanctions on the parents.156 The
Yoder Court held that the statute imposed a substantial burden and was
unconstitutional because it “affirmatively compel[led the defendants],
under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”157
Federal courts have combined the holdings of Sherbert and Yoder to
formulate the substantial burden requirement under RFRA: a substantial
burden is imposed only when individuals are either “forced to choose
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit” or “coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs
by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.”158 Courts only apply strict
scrutiny and shift the burden to the government if the plaintiff can first
establish a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion.159 Two
cases demonstrate the difficulty Indigenous groups face when trying to
provide sufficient evidence to establish a substantial burden on their
religious rights: Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers160 and Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service.161
1.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corp of
Engineers

In Standing Rock, several American Indian tribes challenged
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL).162 When the suit was
initiated, DAPL was nearly complete, except for a stretch that was to run
under the bed of Lake Oahe, a federally regulated waterway bordering

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 218.
Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069–70.
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 206; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963).
239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017).
535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
Standing Rock, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 80.
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North and South Dakota.163 Lake Oahe is located about half a mile north
of the Standing Rock Reservation and seventy-three miles north of the
Cheyenne River Reservation.164
Four separate groups of Lakota people within the Cheyenne River
Reservation use Lake Oahe to perform water-based religious
ceremonies.165 These rituals require the water to be pure, and tribes
contend that the mere presence of oil in DAPL flowing underneath Lake
Oahe contaminates the lake’s water and interferes with their religious
practices.166 Further, the tribes believe the crude oil that would flow
through DAPL is the “fulfillment of a Lakota prophecy of a Black Snake
that would be coiled in the Tribe’s homeland and which would harm” or
kill them.167 The tribes also argued that Lake Oahe is incredibly important
to their existence because the U.S. removed their access to other bodies
of water that are important in their culture.168
Despite the importance of Lake Oahe to the tribes, the court denied the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes’ motion for preliminary
injunction to block the government from permitting DAPL to run under
Lake Oahe.169 One of the tribes’ main contentions was that the
government approval of DAPL violated RFRA.170 The court
acknowledged that the Lakota people have a sincerely held belief that the
presence of oil in DAPL running under Lake Oahe interferes with its
members’ religious ceremonies.171 Nevertheless, it concluded DAPL was
not a substantial burden on their religious rights because the government
action did not impose any sanction on the tribes’ members for exercising
their religious beliefs, nor did it pressure them to choose between a
government benefit or practicing their religion.172 This case emphasizes
the onerous nature of the substantial burden requirement that is
responsible for denying a majority of Indigenous groups’ religious
freedom claims.

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 89.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 90.
168. Id. at 89.
169. Id. at 100.
170. See id. at 91.
171. See id.
172. See id. (“The government action here . . . does not impose a sanction on the Tribe’s members
for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them to choose between religious exercise
and the receipt of government benefits.”).
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Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service

In Navajo Nation, American Indian tribes brought a suit to prohibit the
federal government from allowing the Snowbowl ski resort to use
recycled wastewater for artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks (the
Peaks).173 The tribes argued that the use of recycled wastewater would
“spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious
exercises.”174 The Peaks serve as the location for various religious
ceremonies, including the Navajo Blessingway Ceremony.175 Further, the
Peaks contain many resources for the tribes such as plants, water, and
other materials that are used for medicinal bundles and tribal healing
ceremonies.176 From the tribes’ perspective, using artificial snow on this
sacred mountain would interfere with their religious ceremonies and
desecrate the entire mountain.177
However, like the Standing Rock court held nine years later, the Navajo
Nation court reasoned that the presence of wastewater on the Peaks did
not coerce the tribes to act contrary to their religious beliefs under threat
of sanctions, nor did it condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that
would violate their religious beliefs.178 The court found that the use of
artificial snow would not impose a substantial burden on the tribes’
exercise of religion, stating that “[t]he only effect of the proposed [project]
is on the [tribes’] subjective, emotional religious experience.”179 As
discussed below, the majority opinion presented similar reasoning to that
of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision in the Maunakea case.180 Even
though the entirety of Maunakea is sacred to Native Hawaiians and the
entirety of the Peaks is sacred to the Navajo Nation, both courts justified
their holdings on the basis that the proposed government action would
173. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2008). This is not the
first time these tribes have challenged government action on the Peaks with regards to Snowbowl.
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Wilson v. Block, the American Indian tribes
challenged a number of proposed upgrades to the operations of Snowbowl including the installation
of new lifts, slopes, and facilities. 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Despite arguments that the
proposals would significantly damage the tribes’ ability to pray and engage in other religious
exercises, the court rejected the challenge. Id. at 741–42 (“Many government actions may offend
religious believers, and may cast doubt upon the veracity of religious beliefs, but unless such actions
penalize faith, they do not burden religion.”).
174. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
175. Id. at 1064.
176. Id.
177. Id. 1062–63.
178. Id. at 1070 (“[T]he diminishment of spiritual fulfillment–serious though it may be–is not a
‘substantial burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”).
179. Id.
180. See infra Part III.
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only affect a small part of the mountains.181 Notably, neither court
considered an argument that damage to even minor areas could impact the
religious practices of these Indigenous groups.182
In the Navajo dissenting opinion, Judge Fletcher contended that the
majority’s interpretation of substantial burden was extremely
restrictive.183 He further argued that the majority’s interpretation erred
because RFRA does not incorporate any pre-RFRA definition of
substantial burden, attacking the synergy of the rules in Sherbert and
Yoder.184 Moreover, the purpose of RFRA was to expand religious
protection, not contract it.185 Judge Fletcher’s dissent suggested adopting
the “plain and ordinary meaning [of substantial burden] that does not
depend on the presence of a penalty or deprivation of benefit.”186
The federal court system has set the tone for the individual states,
making it increasingly difficult to ensure adequate protection for
Indigenous groups’ religious and cultural rights. Post-Smith, Congress
immediately passed RFRA to provide greater protection for religious
rights. However, federal courts have severely limited RFRA’s
application—contrary to Congress’s intent. Such a critical issue demands
further attention from both Congress and state legislatures.
III. HAWAI‘I STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION:
APPROVING TMT CONSTRUCTION
As federal courts have severely limited RFRA protections, so too have
many states. The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies just
how difficult it remains for Indigenous groups to receive religious
protections at the state level. The nationally recognized Maunakea
protests were sparked by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in
the In re Conservation District Use Application HA-3568.187 This case
upheld a decision by the BLNR that approved the permit for TMT’s

181. See In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 770 (Haw.
2018) (reasoning that TMT would not affect Native Hawaiian religious practices because it was not
within the relative area of Native Hawaiian cultural sites); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070 (noting
that the use of recycled wastewater will only affect 1% of the Peaks). The Hawai‘i State Supreme
Court did not conduct a RFRA analysis because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 771. They did, however, use similar
reasoning to the Navajo Nation court in denying the Native Hawaiian’s claims. Id. at 770.
182. See generally Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058; In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752.
183. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018).
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construction.188 The Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision reflects the
national trend of favoring competing development interests over the
religious rights of Indigenous groups.
Caltech and the University of California formed the original TMT
corporation in 2003 with the intention of “fostering astronomy through
building a thirty meter telescope”189 and submitted a conservation land use
permit for the TMT proposal in 2010.190 Despite failing to hold a contested
case hearing, the BLNR granted the permit on April 12, 2013.191 TMT
International Observatory, LLC (TIO) was later created as a nonprofit
organization in May of 2014 and succeeded the original TMT corporation
as owner of the project.192 However, in 2015, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
unanimously vacated the permit and held that the BLNR’s approval of the
permit before conducting a contested case hearing violated the due
process rights of parties with standing to assert Native Hawaiian rights.193
Notably, the Court held that state agencies must act consistently with their
affirmative obligations under the Hawai‘i Constitution.194
After the permit was vacated, the BLNR held a contested case hearing
and submitted its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision to
grant the conservation permit to TIO.195 Native Hawaiian cultural

188. Id. at 782.
189. Id. at 759.
190. See id. at 760. Maunakea is part of the two million acres of conservation lands around the
Hawaiian Islands protected in Hawai‘i’s conservation district. See Sacred Summits: Legal
Protections, KAHEA, http://kahea.org/issues/sacred-summits/legal-protections [http://perma.cc/5CP
V-FS56]. The purpose of these conservation district designations is to “conserve, protect, and preserve
the important natural resources of [Hawai‘i] through appropriate management and use to promote
their long-term sustainability and the public health, safety and welfare.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 183C-1
(2020). Commercial use of lands within conservation districts require a Conservation District Use
Permit (CDUP), which must be approved by the State Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR).
See KAHEA, supra.
191. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760.
192. See id. at 759. TMT International Observatory is “comprised of the Regents of the University
of California, Caltech, the National Institutes of Natural Sciences of Japan, the National Astronomical
Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Department of Science and Technology of
India, and the National Research Council of Canada.” Id.
193. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 363 P.3d 224, 238–39 (Haw. 2015).
194. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760 (citing Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, 363 P.3d at 262).
In Ka Pa‘akai O Ka‘Aina v. Land Use Commission, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court held that
article XII, section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution places “an affirmative duty on the State and its
agencies to preserve and protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights.” 7 P.3d 1068, 1082
(Haw. 2000). The core of this affirmative duty is the responsibility of the State and its agencies to act
only after “independently considering the effect of their actions on Hawaiian traditions and practices.”
Id. at 1083.
195. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760.
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practitioners appealed directly to the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court.196
On appeal, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court considered several issues
related to TMT’s construction, including whether TMT infringed on the
religious rights of Native Hawaiians and whether TMT violated
constitutional public trust and land use requirements.197
A.

Native Hawaiian Rights Issues

The Court first considered whether the BLNR acted in accordance with
the Hawai‘i Constitution to protect Native Hawaiian rights. Article XII,
section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution provides that the state government
must protect “all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised
for . . . cultural and religious purposes” that Native Hawaiians possess.198
At the outset, the Court reiterated the State’s obligation to protect the
reasonable exercise of customary and traditional Hawaiian rights, to the
extent feasible.199 In order to effectuate article XII, section 7, the Court
applied the balancing test between Native Hawaiian rights and competing
private interests that was articulated in Ka Pa‘akai OKa‘Āina v. Land Use
Commission.200 This test requires an administrative agency to, at a
minimum, make three specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.201
First, an agency must determine the “identity and scope of ‘valued
cultural, historical, or natural resources’ in the [relevant] area, including
the extent to which traditional and customary [N]ative Hawaiian rights are
exercised in the . . . area.”202 Second, the agency must find “the extent to
which those resources—including traditional and customary [N]ative
Hawaiian rights—will be affected or impaired by the proposed action.”203
Finally, the agency must assess the feasibility of further agency action to
reasonably protect Native Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist in

196. The appeal was made pursuant to a Hawai‘i statute that allows direct appeals for final
decisions in contested cases regarding conservation districts. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 183C-9 (2020).
197. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 761. The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court also considered
a number of disqualification issues (such as whether potential prejudice towards Native Hawaiians
and the hearing officer having family ties to astronomy centers tainted the contested hearing), public
trust and land use issues, and procedural issues. See id. However, these issues are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
198. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
199. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768; see also Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw.
Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271 n.43 (Haw. 1995) (reaffirming the State’s obligation to
protect Native Hawaiian rights “to the extent feasible”).
200. 7 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Haw. 2000); In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768–69.
201. Ka Pa‘akai O Ka‘Āina, 7 P.3d at 1084.
202. Id. (footnote omitted).
203. Id.
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the area.204
The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court ultimately found that the BLNR
satisfied the Kapa‘akai test, fulfilling its obligations under the Hawai‘i
Constitution.205 Regarding the first requirement, the Court agreed with the
BLNR’s conclusion that there was no evidence of Native Hawaiian
cultural resources or religious exercise at the proposed observatory site or
the access road.206 The Court determined that a majority of the Native
Hawaiian cultural practitioners conduct their practices in other areas of
Maunakea’s summit, such as Lake Waiau, Pu‘u Līlīnoe, or
Kūkahau‘ula.207 The TMT Observatory site is located 600 feet below the
summit and because of this, the Court found that the TMT would not
interfere with Native Hawaiian religious practices.208
For the second requirement, the Court found that the TMT project
would not impair or affect the area’s cultural, historical, and natural
resources.209 According to the Court, the resources would not be affected
because “the TMT Observatory will not be visible from . . . culturally
sensitive areas of the summit of [Maunakea].”210 Further, the Court noted
that spiritual practices have been occurring for nearly two decades while
astronomy facilities have existed.211 However, this ignored the argument
that Native Hawaiian cultural practitioners were either forced to forgo
their customary and traditional exercises or accept the existing telescopes
and continue their practices.212 It also disregarded the fact that the Native
Hawaiians believe the entire mountain is sacred; therefore, the mere
presence of these observatories and astronomy facilities is abhorrent to
sacred tradition.213
Lastly, because the Court did not find that Native Hawaiian rights were
exercised in the TMT Observatory site area, the BLNR was not required
to discuss measures to ensure the protection of Native Hawaiian rights and

204. Id.
205. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 771.
206. Id. at 769.
207. Id. at 769–70.
208. Id. at 770.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra section I.B.
213. See, e.g., NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 3 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie et al. eds.,
2015) (“Kānaka Maoli trace their ancestry to the ‘āina (land), to the natural forces of the
world . . . . All are related in a deep and profound way that infuses Hawaiian thought and is expressed
in all facets of Hawaiian life.”).
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practices under the third factor.214 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the BLNR had met the requirements of the Ka Pa‘akai test.
The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court also dismissed the appellants’
arguments that the TMT project violates their federally protected right to
the free exercise of their religion.215 Giving significant deference to the
BLNR’s decision that TMT would not substantially burden Native
Hawaiians’ religious rights, the Court rejected claims under the Free
Exercise Clause.216 The Court also declined to apply RFRA because the
United States Supreme Court held that RFRA’s statutory protections are
inapplicable to state government actions.217
B.

Public Trust and Land Use Issue

In addition to the numerous Native Hawaiian rights issues, the
appellants also asserted various public trust and land use claims.218 The
appellants first argued that the TMT project violated article XI, section 1
of the Hawai‘i Constitution.219 The Hawai‘i Constitution’s public trust
provision stipulates that the State “shall conserve and protect [Hawai‘i’s]
natural beauty and all natural resources . . . and . . . promote the
development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with
their conservation.”220 This provision also mandates that “[a]ll public
natural resources are held in trust . . . for the benefit of the people.”221 To
comply with article XI, section 1, the government must balance between
“conservation and protection of public natural resources, . . . and the
development and utilization of these resources.”222 When balancing these
interests, there is a “presumption in favor of public use, access and
enjoyment.”223

214. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 770. The BLNR did impose “special conditions” to avoid
impact on Native Hawaiian practices although seemingly very minimal and not addressing the core
issue of development on an extremely sacred mountain. Id. These conditions included limiting
daytime activities at TMT on up to four days per year, ceasing construction if historic remains are
found, and allowing Native Hawaiians reasonable access to the TMT Observatory site to exercise
any traditional and customary practices. Id. at n.18.
215. Id. at 771.
216. Id.
217. Id. Notably, the Court’s discussion of the Free Exercise Clause was limited to just two short
paragraphs and the opinion is absent of any Sherbert or Smith analysis. See id.
218. Id. at 773–79.
219. Id. at 773.
220. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
221. Id.
222. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 773.
223. Id. at 774.
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The Court concluded that TMT comports with article XI, section 1.224
In doing so, the Court reasoned that the “BLNR’s finding that the TMT
[p]roject will not cause substantial adverse impact to geologic sites is not
challenged.”225 The Court further explained that the land will be restored
pursuant to the “Decommissioning Plan” at the end of its “50 year useful
life” or the end of the lease, whichever comes first.226 Although the Court
was confident that measures implemented by the BLNR would help
protect the land, this rationale fails to account for the previous fifty plus
years of mismanagement of the existing telescopes. This mismanagement
has polluted the area and deepened the distrust within the Native Hawaiian
community of the government’s ability to effectively maintain and
preserve Maunakea’s natural resources.227 The BLNR had similarly
imposed conditions on UH’s lease, yet severe, irreversible damage
resulted regardless of those conditions.228
Native Hawaiians also asserted that use of TMT is a private use, while
Native Hawaiians’ use of the land is public.229 However, the Court
reiterated that there was no evidence that Native Hawaiians used the site
area.230 The Court further explained the astronomical significance of the
TMT project, noting that the people of Hawai‘i benefit greatly from the
selection of Maunakea for its location.231 After explaining how TMT will
provide grants, scholarships, and a workforce pipeline program for
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) students, the
Court concluded that TMT’s use of the land is “consistent with
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.”232 In
doing so, the Court established a precedent that says projects indirectly
providing substantial benefits to the State will justify substantial burdens
on Native Hawaiian rights.
IV. A SOLUTION TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT NATIVE
HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
Native Hawaiian rights and the genuinely held religious beliefs of
Indigenous people consistently yield to the economic benefits of private
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra section I.B.
See supra section I.B.
See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 775.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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development under existing federal and state law. Hawai‘i does not have
a state RFRA, but even if there were such protections, the arduous
substantial burden test has proved to be fatal to most Indigenous groups’
RFRA claims. Thus, to ensure protection of Native Hawaiian cultural and
religious rights, the Hawai‘i State Legislature should both enact a state
version of RFRA and codify a new definition of “substantial burden.”
A.

Enact a Hawai‘i State RFRA

The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies the difficulty
of succeeding on Indigenous religious rights claims without the presence
of a state RFRA.233 The United States Supreme Court held that RFRA is
unconstitutional as applied to the states234 and to date, the Hawai‘i State
Legislature has not enacted a version of RFRA. Without these statutory
protections, Indigenous rights are not effectively protected. The primary
alternative to a state RFRA claim would be for Native Hawaiian plaintiffs
to bring an action under the Free Exercise Clause. While strict scrutiny
has historically applied to Free Exercise Clause claims, Smith has severely
eroded these constitutional protections by declining to apply strict
scrutiny to valid and neutral laws of general applicability that substantially
burden religious rights. Consequently, Smith’s holding generally controls
for neutral, generally applicable state laws that burden the free exercise of
religion and strict scrutiny is not applied.235 A state RFRA that mandates
the application of strict scrutiny would provide the more protective legal
claim that Congress originally intended for all people pre-Boerne.
Even if the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court adopted a common law
RFRA-like test, it is always subject to being overturned, or, as seen in
Smith, severely confined to a very particular set of facts. Therefore, the
most effective method to provide protection for religious rights is to call
on the Hawai‘i State Legislature to enact its own version of RFRA. A
RFRA bill that includes the following language is needed: “Neither the
State nor its political subdivisions shall substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the imposition of the
burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
233. See supra section II.B.
234. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its
legislative powers because it enforced RFRA under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and
the federal balance”).
235. See, e.g., State v. Sunderland, 168 P.3d 526, 530 (Haw. 2007) (concluding that despite the
defendant’s arguments that “Congress enacted RFRA . . . to expressly supersede Smith’s elimination
of the compelling interest analysis in the context of generally applicable governmental
regulation, . . . Smith plainly controls”).
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restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”236
Passing a state version of RFRA is not without drawbacks. A major
issue is the conflict between religious liberty and civil rights, specifically
rights of the LGBTQ+ community. Article I, section 5 of the Hawai‘i
State Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination against individuals
on the basis of race, religion, sex, or ancestry.237 Furthermore, the Hawai‘i
Employment Practices Act238 provides it is unlawful for employers to
discriminate “[b]ecause of race, sex including gender identity or
expression, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry, disability,
marital status, arrest and court record, reproductive health decision, or
domestic or sexual violence victim status.”239
While it is beyond dispute that discrimination is an important concern,
civil rights can be preserved with protective language. Therefore, the bill
for a Hawai‘i state RFRA should also include the following language:
This law shall provide a claim or defense whenever the free exercise of an
individual’s religious beliefs or practices is substantially burdened by the
government, unless the religious practice is in violation of the Hawai‘i
State Constitution, the Hawai‘i Employment Practices Act, or being used
as a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal by a
provider to offer or provide services to any member or members of the
general public on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.240
Including this language precludes potential discrimination against
individuals under the guise of religious freedom.241
236. While not the exact language used in the Hawai‘i State RFRA bill that failed to pass, this
language is modeled after that bill. See H.B. 823, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017) (“State action shall not
burden any person’s right to exercise religion; provided that a burden shall be permissible if the
burden results from a law or rule of general applicability and the burden to the person’s exercise of
religion: (1) Is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) Is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”).
237. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
238. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378 (2020).
239. Id. § 378-2(a)(1).
240. This language is modeled after the anti-discrimination provisions in the Hawai‘i State
Constitution, Hawai‘i Employment Practices Act, and the Indiana state RFRA. See HAW. CONST.
art. 1, § 5; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(1); SEA 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
241. There may be potential Establishment Clause issues with this proposed protective language.
However, Indiana passed a highly controversial RFRA bill in 2015, which was deemed a license to
discriminate by LGBTQ rights advocates. See Dwight Adams, RFRA: Why the ‘Religious Freedom
Law’ Signed by Mike Pence Was So Controversial, INDYSTAR (May 3, 2018, 3:23 PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/04/25/rfra-indiana-why-law-signed-mike-pence-socontroversial/546411002 [http://perma.cc/XN75-HGPM]. As a result of substantial public scrutiny
and boycotts from numerous states, companies, and organizations (including the NBA and NCAA),
Indiana passed Senate Enrolled Act 50 in 2015—amending the State RFRA to provide similar civil
rights protections to the proposed Hawai‘i RFRA. See id.; SEA 50, 119th Gen. Assemb. SEA 50 states
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In addition to discrimination, other state governments have raised
concerns about an explosion of litigation from passing a state RFRA.242
However, contrary to speculation, claims under state RFRA laws have
been surprisingly rare among the states that have enacted them.243
Notably, one scholar asserted that although some states have seen
significant amounts of state RFRA litigation, “many state RFRAs seem[]
‘to exist almost entirely on the books.’”244 Of the sixteen states with
RFRA laws, four states have not considered any claims under their RFRA,
and six other states report only one or two cases.245 Thus, critics’ concerns
of increased litigation appear unfounded, or at the very least, overstated.
In the Maunakea litigation, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ RFRA claim because the federal statute does not apply to the
states.246 Passing a Hawai‘i state RFRA would give Native Hawaiian
rights advocates a more cognizable legal claim where other claims have
fallen short of providing adequate protection.
B.

Redefining “Substantial Burden”

While a Hawai‘i state RFRA that imposes strict scrutiny is the first step
towards protecting Native Hawaiian rights, it is insufficient standing
alone. Before courts even conduct a strict scrutiny analysis, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the government action imposes a substantial burden on
their religious practices.247 This burden is so onerous that not a single
Indigenous plaintiff was able to produce sufficient evidence to meet this

that the Indiana RFRA does not “authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services . . . on the
basis of . . . sex, sexual orientation, [or] gender identity.” Id. Moreover, SEA 50 does not allow RFRA
to be used as “a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal by a provider to offer or
provide services . . . to any member or members of the general public on the basis of . . . sex, sexual
orientation, [or] gender identity.” Id. While these civil rights protections have withstood numerous
legal challenges since 2015, litigation is still ongoing. See Crystal Hill, The Fight Against RFRA Isn’t
Over. Meet Its Conservative Opponent, INDYSTAR (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:10 PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2020/03/26/rfra-indiana-why-conservative-lawyersuing-over-law/4860169002/ [https://perma.cc/W3P6-4D9V]. It is worth noting that this protective
language remains current law in Indiana. An analysis of the Establishment Clause implications is
however, beyond the scope of this Comment.
242. See, e.g., Reinach, supra note 148, at 825 (explaining that senators in the Arizona State Senate
argued a state RFRA would open the door to a drastic increase in litigation if the bill were adopted).
243. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D.
L. REV. 466, 467 (2010).
244. Long, supra note 148, at 272 (quoting Lund, supra note 243, at 467).
245. Id.
246. See supra section III.A; see generally In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA3568, 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018).
247. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).
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requirement in the aforementioned federal case law.248 Scholars have
argued that “[c]ourts grossly misunderstand, and improperly heighten, the
threshold requirement of a substantial burden on religious exercise.”249
The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a substantial
burden creates problems because of its narrowly confined meaning that
only applies to two specific situations: (1) “when individuals are forced to
choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit”; or (2) “coerced to act contrary to their religious
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.”250 Any lesser burden
is not substantial and does not require strict scrutiny.251 Thus, the Court’s
interpretation effectively “places beyond judicial scrutiny many burdens
on religious exercise that RFRA was intended to prevent.”252 The Hawai‘i
State Supreme Court indicated that it uses the same test as federal courts
when addressing whether government action is a substantial burden on
religious practices.253 Therefore, it is clear that the same restrictive
standard would apply to Native Hawaiian religious rights claims.
The solution to this arduous standard is for Congress and state
legislatures to statutorily mandate the courts to adopt a new interpretation
of what constitutes a substantial burden in order to provide the necessary
protection for Native Hawaiian and Indigenous groups’ rights nationwide.
Such a statute should codify a more literal, plain language definition of
substantial burden, similar to the one articulated by Judge Fletcher’s
dissenting opinion in Navajo Nation.254 Recall that the purpose of RFRA
was “to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.”255 Black’s Law Dictionary defines burden as “[s]omething that
hinders or oppresses.”256 Moreover, the American Heritage Dictionary
defines substantial as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree,

248. See supra section II.C.
249. Lund, supra note 243, at 468; see also Reinach, supra note 148, at 845 (“Government officials
are beginning to understand that they can abridge religious liberty and argue that they have not
imposed a substantial burden.”).
250. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069–70.
251. See id. at 1070.
252. Id. at 1091 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
253. See State v. Armitage, 319 P.3d 1044, 1070 (Haw. 2014) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) as its authority for the substantial burden inquiry) (“Having concluded that Petitioners
practice of religion was not substantially burdened . . . the remainder of the Sherbert test need not be
applied.” (emphasis added)).
254. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1091 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
256. Burden, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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amount, or extent.”257 To protect Native Hawaiian religious rights, the
Hawai‘i state RFRA should define substantially burden as “considerably
hinder or oppress.”
Applying this new definition of substantial burden to the dispute over
Maunakea would effectively protect the Native Hawaiian rights. Native
Hawaiians believe Maunakea is a “sacred manifestation of their ancestry,
[and] should be honored in its natural state.”258 The government’s
approval of the TMT permit considerably hinders Native Hawaiians’
ability to engage in cultural practices on Maunakea. Not only are Native
Hawaiians forced to go through numerous procedures to have access to
their own stolen land, but the spirituality of their traditions and practices
is severely curtailed by TMT’s presence on their sacred land. Moreover,
the construction of previous observatories already had significant adverse
impacts on cultural, archaeological, and historic resources.259 TMT’s
construction would further alter and damage the natural state of
Maunakea, imposing a substantial burden on Native Hawaiian
religious traditions.
Enacting a Hawai‘i State RFRA, in conjunction with a new, literal
definition of substantial burden, would provide a legal avenue for Native
Hawaiians to protect their cultural and religious rights.
CONCLUSION
In balancing Indigenous rights with competing development interests,
the state and federal courts have generally allowed governmental
intrusions on Indigenous groups’ religious and cultural rights. By
allowing TMT to be built on Maunakea, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court
has further demonstrated the need for greater protection of Native
Hawaiian rights. Without adequate legal remedies, the Native Hawaiian
community has been forced to resort to mass protests out of desperation
to protect the lands they consider sacred.
To rectify these issues, the Hawai‘i State Legislature should enact a
version of RFRA with a new definition of “substantial burden.” These
protections are necessary not only to safeguard Native Hawaiian religious
and cultural rights, but also to ensure that “religious conscience is
respected and that the regulatory state does not unduly infringe on
religious belief.”260 Although the Maunakea protests have halted TMT
257. Substantial, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=substantial [https://perma.cc/5TRC-LQ26].
258. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw. 2018).
259. See id. at 758–59.
260. Reinach, supra note 148, at 854.
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construction, these additional measures are still necessary to protect the
rights of Native Hawaiians.

